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# Refugee Integration in Germany

Pulkit Buttan

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## Abstract

Since the advent of the Syrian civil war, many people have been displaced around the world. Most of them have taken shelter in neighbouring countries including Turkey and Jordan. By 2015, the effects of civil war were being felt beyond the Middle East, especially in Europe. A large number of Syrian refugees crossed the Mediterranean to take shelter in various European countries. However, many of these countries turned inward and shut their doors with Germany keeping open its gates for Syrian refugees and accepting them through adopting welcoming policy measures and initiatives to integrate these refugees. The integration of these refugees has significantly impacted Germany's economy, politics, society and culture.

## Introduction

By mid-2020, there were around 79.5 million displaced people around the world (UNHCR 2020). Among them, 45.7 million were internally displaced, 26 million were refugees, and 4.2 million were asylum seekers. The 1951 UNHCR has defined the refugee as "someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group" (UNHCR 2020). Whenever a refugee reaches a country, one of the significant challenges he faces is integration. Integration is a complex process that requires that migrants get adjusted to their new daily realities. Furthermore, it necessitates the recipient communities to open up their space for refugees to be and feel accommodated. Successful integration has positive effects on the well-being of the refugees. It helps in moderating the effects of prior trauma (Hynie 2018). As per UNHCR, integration is a complex and gradual process with distinct but interrelated legal, economic, social and cultural dimensions (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2017). It requires a coordinated and concerted response from both refugees and recipient communities.

The states which are signatory to the 1951 Convention are committed to granting various rights to refugees. Various members of society participate in this process like employment, housing agencies, school, health care

workers, NGOs, Trade Unions etc. (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2017).

## Theoretical background

The existing literature on refugee and integration spans various disciplines. The issue of refugees has been discussed within the field of International Relations by various scholars. Realists try to establish a link between realism and humanitarianism by looking into the strategic motives of perpetrators of forced migration. The liberals talk about the need for cooperation for refugees (Snyder 2011). They advocate the need for norms in international regimes to make it obligatory for states to help refugees (Betts 2011). Constructivists look into the social constructs that give rise to 'refugees' and their protection regime (Barnett 2011). The gender perspective looks into the everyday concerns of refugees.

Scholars have different perceptions on the impact of refugees and their integration on the host society. As far as the positive impact is concerned, Dryden Peterson and Hovil argue that sometimes it leads to the free-riding phenomenon (McKinsey, 2016; Özer, 2014). Also, some argue that individual skillsets and their occupations also improve integration. For instance, individuals with limited skill in the recipient area's language affect their employment and education prospects. The strength of social connection also has a bidirectional relationship with the refugees' employment, education, and health. (Hynie, Korn, and Tao 2016; Kearns and Whitley 2015).

In academia, many scholars have tried to theorise integration. Ager and Strange came out with a model of integration that focuses on health, housing, education, employment, rights, citizenship, social connections, etc. She divided them into four categories: markers and means, social connections, facilitators and foundation. In 2016, Hynie proposed another model that focuses on social context, social bonds, connections within the communities, and institution and society's adaptation. Hynie brought the holistic integration model that focuses on the social context. It looked into the social bonds within the refugee communities, social bridges that connect them with other communities, attitudes of the general community towards refugees and institutional adaptation or how institutions recognise their needs (Hynie, Korn, and Tao 2016). In 2019, Phillimore came

out with an opportunity structure framework that looks into five structures: locality, structures, initiatives, discourse, and relations. In this paper, I have used this opportunity structure framework in Germany, particularly after 2013.

## Methodology

This research aims to look into refugee integration in Germany, particularly after the start of the Syrian refugee crisis. For that, the researcher has used Phillimore's opportunity structures framework. She defined opportunity structures as

"...sets of resources, arrangements and pathways that can facilitate or block integration through mechanisms such as inclusion, racism and xenophobia, policy and practice offer potential for examining multidimensional aspects of receiving-society contexts that can shape refugee-integration opportunities" (Phillimore 2020).

The model helps us understand how receiving countries influence refugee integration and what kind of opportunity structure shapes integration outcomes. Her model is based on five opportunity structures: a) locality, b) discourse, c) relations, d) structures, and e) initiatives.

a) Locality: The locality is vital because asylum seeker and refugee dispersal policies are crucial for the state's immigration policies. Such policies are based on spreading the burden to ensure that arrival zones in a state are not overwhelmed, reducing costs by placing refugees in low-cost accommodation, addressing skill gaps etc.

b) Discourse: It plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion on immigrants. Sometimes, during the refugee crisis, refugees are seen as threats and intruders. The media and political discourse play a crucial role in influencing how society will perceive immigrants' arrival.

c) Relations: There is a need to look into how societal relations shape after refugees enter the state. Phillimore argues that attitudes towards refugees are not fixed. Sometimes refugees are seen as exemplifiers of a diverse society, but sometimes they have to face xenophobic attacks and discrimination (USA Today 2015; The Guardian 2015). The kind of relations they have with society determines their integration outcomes.

c) Structures: are also pertinent. Refugee integration outcomes are often shaped by the nature of immigration and integration regimes. The structure includes institutional arrangements that impact refugee integration. It is different from the opportunity

structure. The opportunity structure has a broader meaning and entails both subjective and objective aspects of integration, ranging from public opinion to institutional response. However, the structure mainly includes the institutions, rules and laws related to refugee integration (Phillimore 2020).

d) Initiatives: She argues that we should look into specific integration programmes and social networks. There are two main approaches to support integration: the Migrant and Refugee Community Organization (MRCO) and the host state's programmes. It focuses on co-management and co-governance models and initiatives (Phillimore 2020).

This research aims to understand whether the opportunity structure model is viable to understand integration and look into how opportunity structures influence integration. It is a qualitative study in which the researcher has used both primary and secondary sources. For the primary sources, the researcher has used BAMF reports (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service), IAB-BAMF SOEP Survey, etc. For the secondary sources, the researcher has relied on research articles, commentaries, reports etc. In this paper, the focus is on the developments after 2013 because the period represents one of the most significant groups of migrants in Europe's history and German history. Secondly, the refugees, mostly comprised of Syrians, could fulfil Germany's human capital need and help counter the challenges arising from Germany's ageing population (Tigau 2019).

## A brief history of emigration and immigration in Germany

Historically speaking, Germany has been a centre of both emigration and immigration. The earliest migration could be traced back to the 12<sup>th</sup> century, when people migrated to the Hungarian kingdom from Rhine and Mosel (Blade 2003). The German settlement can also be found in both Central and South-Eastern European regions and in Russia. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Germany was considered a country of emigration, and a large number of Polish workers were brought to Germany to work in the mining sector. Later, some foreign workers also came here to work in the manufacturing sector during World War II. After the Second World War, Germany became one of the most favoured destinations for immigrants (Rietig and Müller 2016). Around 12 million refugees came to Germany between 1945-49. Around 70,000 people applied for asylum. The majority of asylum seekers came from the European region that could be exemplified by the entry of 16,000 Hungarians (1956-57) and the granting of asylum to 4,000 Czechoslovakians after the Prague Spring (1968) (Oltmer 2017). In the 1960s, Germany also

witnessed the rise of foreign workers under the Guest Worker Programmes, with the majority from Turkey, Spain and Greece.

Since the 1970s, Germany has pursued an immigration policy that has shifted the pendulum towards skilled refugees. So, the economic imperative has dominated (Jurgens 2010). After the end of the Guestworker program, Germany saw the influx of 'boat people' from Vietnam to escape the communist rule at home. West Germany accepted these refugees (DW, 2003). In 1978, the Commissioner for Integration was established and proved to be a turning point in Germany. The federal government acknowledged guest workers' permanent presence and started considering their integration prospects (European Commission, 2019).

Another significant immigration wave occurred due to various factors, including the coup d'état in Turkey, regime change in Iran, and Poland's domestic conflicts. Between 1980-90, the majority of asylum applicants were from Eastern, Central-Eastern, South-Eastern Europe. The response in Western Germany toward these cohorts was liberal while, in Eastern Germany, the asylum was subject to arbitrary control of the Communist party officials. It was heavily centralised in favour of party officials under the notion of a homogenous population. After the fall of the Berlin wall, these debates culminated in the asylum compromise. It was an amalgamation of "democratic values and the traditional notion of national belonging to unified Germany" (Oltmer 2017). In 2000, the German Nationality Act was implemented, which liberalised the 1913 law and eased acquiring German citizenship to those living in Germany for the long term (Amt Auswärtiges 2014). Germany established new immigration law in 2005 in response to the demographic crisis stemming from an ageing population. There was also a decline in the birth rate, and it was seen as an economic necessity. The Migration Act of 2005, apart from containing provisions for entry of foreigners into Germany, talks about their residence in the country, termination of residence and procedures for asylum. This act was later amended in 2007 to implement 11 EU directives on residence and asylum rules. It was also done to prevent sham or forced marriages, enhance internal security, facilitate the immigration of company founders etc. The Residence Act made the visa itself a residence permit and was applicable on short stays only. The Immigration Act also talks about fostering integration and ensuring full participation and their duty to learn the German language and comply with the constitution (Auswärtiges Amt 2020).

The German government currently has two plans to foster social integration and social inclusion of migrants, namely, the National Integration Plan 2007

and the National Action Plan on Integration 2012. In 2007, The National Integration Plan came into existence highlighting training, employment, education and cultural integration for migrants. Germany had also introduced an Integration Programme at the national level in 2010. It was done to bring standardisation of integration measures taken at all levels, i.e., federal, state, and local. The programme includes language courses, vocational training, and civic education. In 2012, the National Action Plan on Integration came into force, setting general objectives and focussing on time-based outcomes of integration of migrants. Most importantly, it identifies several indicators to ensure the goals are attained, like optimising individual support for young migrants, providing healthcare services to them, and increasing their civil service share at both federal and state-level (European Commission 2019). To tackle the challenges emerging from the growing number of refugees and asylum seekers in the wake of the refugee crisis in Europe, the Meseberg declaration in integration was adopted in 2016. It is based on a two-way principle, namely offering support, job opportunities, training facilities etc., on the one hand, and making efforts for their safe return on the other (European Commission, 2019).

### **Refugee Crisis in Europe and Germany's response:**

The civil war in Syria generated one of the biggest humanitarian crises in recent times. It started in 2011. The Syrians were complaining about corruption, lack of opportunities and unemployment even before the crisis. They were witnessing various problems under President Bashar al-Assad. Pro-democracy demonstrations started in 2011 in Deraa in the wake of the Arab Spring. The government replied with brute force, and the slow crackdown intensified. Various opposition leaders turned violent, and slowly the country moved towards one of the deadliest civil-war in recent history. By December 2018, more than three lakh people have died, and more than 1,900,000 were missing. Apart from the opposition and the ruling factions in the country, various actors are involved in it. Many groups and countries have been accused of fostering jihadist groups IS and al-Qaeda to flourish in Syria and neighbouring countries to accomplish their ulterior motives. The civil war has resulted in mass displacement in the region (BBC News 2019). As per the 2019 statistics, around 13.2 million people from Syria are forcibly displaced. Among these, 6.6 million are refugees, more than a lakh are asylum seekers and 6.1 million are internally displaced. The vast majority of Syrian refugees live in neighbouring countries like Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq etc. (UNHCR 2020). The EU experienced the refugee crisis with an unprecedented influx of more than 1.3 million refugees

coming through the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. Apart from the countries mentioned above, Syrian refugees also went to countries like Germany and Canada. Germany adopted an "open border" policy with around 316098 refugees and 420574 asylum seekers by the end of 2015. In 2016, the German government tightened some of the restrictions. In the backdrop of the agreement between the EU and Turkey (2016), the total number of refugees arriving in Germany in 2016 dropped. The influx of refugees was considered the most significant population increase in the history of Germany. It has boosted the German population by almost one per cent. Most of the asylum seekers coming between 2015 and 2017 were male, and more than 24 per cent were below the age of 24 (Trines 2019). After the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 and before 2015, refugees mostly used the Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy, but this changed in 2015, and they started using the Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to Greece or Bulgaria. The Central Mediterranean route resulted in the development of trafficking and smuggling networks in Libya. Due to this, the EU responded with various measures to reduce irregular arrivals like the Malta Declaration (2017), the establishment of joint migration tasks force with the African Union and the UN (November 2017) and other measures to address migratory flows in Libya like Operation Sophia (Council of the European Union 2020). The migrants adapted routes opting for Central and Northern regions of Europe (Ayoub 2019).

Syrians constituted the most significant population of these refugees in Germany. In 2014, there were around 216,956 refugees in Germany and 226,157 asylum seekers. Around 70,585 were from Syria, and 51,851 were from Iraq. In 2019, the number of refugees was still 1.1 million, and asylum seekers decreased to 309,230. Among them, Syria constitutes 42% of both, followed by Afghan and Iraq. In the first half of 2020, the numbers decreased to 1.77 million from 1.83 million in 2019. According to Oltmer, there are various reasons behind the significant number of migrants in Germany in 2015. Firstly, there are financial resources—most of the refugees fleeing from Syria, Iraq and South-Eastern Europe are relatively close to the EU. So, the movement cost was relatively low, and Turkey that receives mostly Syrians, could offer minimal prospects for future growth. Secondly, migratory networks were well established in Germany for the Syrians. Thirdly, Syrian refugees offered a bright economic prospect in the light of growing debates on labour scarcity in Germany. Also, there was widespread acceptance of Syrian refugees and recognition of their needs for their protection and rights. The Dublin system's dissolution that occurred because of an increasing number of asylum seekers also played a crucial role. Some states were unwilling to take the whole burden under the Dublin system, and this system collapsed. Further,

countries like Britain and France were hesitant to play an active role to manage this crisis. (Oltmer 2017; UNHCR 2020).

Many have refrained from calling it a 'crisis' and called it a humanitarianism crisis or challenge to European identity. Also, different countries across the globe experienced it differently. Some were overwhelmed by the number of refugees, like Italy, Greece or Turkey, and others received fewer refugees like the UK and Canada. The concern for refugee integration was primarily expressed in Europe and the Americas, which hosted not more than 20% of the refugees (Phillimore 2020). The massive inflow of people has tested and challenged the states' capacities. To accommodate these refugees, various countries have employed a range of mechanisms and evolved various policies. These measures often come under the term 'integration'. Refugee integration is a complicated task. To make it successful, various actors, ranging from state to non-state actors, have to come together to accommodate the newly arrived population. These initiatives are taken to ensure the social inclusion of the refugees. The integration and inclusion revolve around granting equal opportunities to the new groups to participate in the hosting states' existing social networks (AbuJarour and Krasnova 2017). The German government has developed a series of programmes with different stakeholders including state, civil society, local governments, refugees, etc. These programmes are established to bring effective integration of refugees (Hindy 2018).

The purpose of this paper is to look into the refugee integration initiatives taken by Germany after the advent of this crisis through Phillimore's opportunity structure framework of integration. The focus is more on the opportunity structures rather than the refugees because of time constraints.

### **Deploying Phillimore's opportunity structure framework for refugee integration in Germany**

An attempt has been made to examine how these five opportunity structures worked in refugee integration in Germany, particularly after 2013.

#### **1. Locality**

For refugee integration, the understanding of local responses is essential. With the influx of refugees and asylum seekers, various states in Germany formed their policies at the local level to deal with the situation. The non-state actors often back some initiatives.

In Germany, the Koningsteiner Schuskulis a system used to distribute asylum seekers across the country. A quota system allocates refugees in different centres based on their capacities and the federal state's size and economic strength (Trines 2019). Geographically

speaking, the eastern part of Germany holds a smaller number of refugees than the western part. In 2017 alone, around 21.1 % applied for asylum in North Rhine-Westphalia, followed by Bavaria and Baden Württemberg (Hindy 2018). This system also leads to an increase in the burden for the bigger states that are densely populated. That is why in 2016, the three city-states, i.e. Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, received many refugees compared to the whole nation which made it difficult for these states to give better housing opportunities. The rental prices were also increased in these areas. The existing federal framework also poses huge responsibility to federal states. Asylum welfare is the state's responsibility and is usually implemented by the municipality of the state. The municipalities and city-states had to take the double burden and perform various activities, including those generally divided between municipality and state. The recipients of asylum welfare were concentrated in the city-states. (Garrelts 2016).

At the local level, states/city-states have also evolved their local mechanism to integrate refugees with various local solutions provided. For example, in Berlin, a city-state with its budget and autonomy evolved a vocational training programme and integration programme. In 2016, Berlin established a welcome centre called Willkommen Zentrum to provide legal and practical advice. It was followed by a Master Plan for Integration and Security (MPIS). It provides all incoming residents with legal and practical advice. After the German reunification, voluntarism and civil society role have increased with the rise in neighbourhood initiatives and community-based programmes. It was also highlighted in the 2016 Master Plan for Integration and Security (MPIS). It also shows the importance of structural support for welcome initiatives and promotes financial, administrative and technical support (Koca 2019).

Various German civil society actors have also come forward to help the state government to create a complex network of volunteerism. For example, in research on experiences of cities in Syrian refugee resettlement in Germany, Garrelts, Noring, and Katz highlighted the role of established players like Caritas and Red Cross in encouraging volunteerism. Various websites have been created, such as [givesomethingbacktoberlin.com](http://givesomethingbacktoberlin.com) that offers volunteer services to refugees. One of the refugees' centres of Hamburg had 140 volunteers for 190 refugees. They provided language training, homework aid, etc. Hamburg also brought together various agencies under the rubric of Anselm Sprandel, the Zentraler Koordinierungsstab für Flüchtlinge (the Central Coordination Taskforce for Refugees). It was set up in collaboration between the Social welfare agency, integration, labour, family and interior affairs agency, and sports affairs agency. It looked into the

renovation of refugee accommodation. Hamburg had better practices than Berlin, where refugees were first accommodated in school gymnasiums. In Berlin, for-profit, private companies also assisted in providing building, catering and cleaning services. For example, Triad, a private event organiser, converted four hangars into an initial refugee reception centre. On the other hand, Hamburg collaborated with municipally-owned housing providers like Forden and Wohen to buy new and repair the existing buildings. Further, Hamburg also collaborated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Hafen City University to develop a City Science Lab and also helped in finding new places for refugees with the help of residents. Berlin city relied on the strategy of modular housing and created a container village. Hamburg has also used the initiative to initiate amendments in national housing codes and allowed the city to place refugees in erstwhile commercial buildings or open areas in residential sites (Garrelts et al., 2016).

Some lander states have formulated their integration acts like Bavarian Integration Act in 2017. The new Act reiterates the efforts for integration in Bavaria. The act has also resulted in amendments to other legal provisions like the Act that empowers police officers to conduct identity controls and search rooms to search locations where persons irregularly reside (EMN 2018). There were regional variations within HAP (Humanitarian Assistance Programme), resettlement and PSR implemented by Germany for Syrians. For example, in terms of resettlement, refugees are distributed by the Kongstein Key system. In this, the distribution is determined by family ties. However, in distributing refugees in different municipalities, federal Lander used the defined key to allocate refugees, while some distributed based on volunteerism by municipalities, specifically those who joined the Save Me Campaign. Some federal lander like NRW (Northern Rhine Westphalia) consider the personal request made by the refugees for specific places of residence and coordinate later by the municipalities. Under HAP Syria, most refugees were allowed to enter independently and were free to travel and join their relatives. (Grote, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016).

In the initial phase of both the HAP and resettlement programme, some lander states set up round tables for planning and improving the beneficiaries' assessment and admission process. For example, in 2016, NRW started preparing a guideline that explains the refugees' motives for leaving Syria which helped in giving guidance to all officials and volunteers involved in the integration process. In 2015, a nationwide project was launched by the German Caritas Association, Caritas Association Hildesheim and Caritasverband for Hildesheim diocese in Friedland reception centre. Its purpose was to strengthen communication and support

services under HAP Syria. In some municipalities, civil society groups like the Save Me Campaign informed the local population of the arrival of protection beneficiaries (Grote, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016).

Besides that, based on section 68 of the Residence Act, in 2013, the government has also established a private sponsorship programme for Syrian beneficiaries of protection. Until the end of 2015, more than 20,000 people were granted a visa to enter Germany under this programme. The sponsors take care of refugees' travel expenses and stay (Grote, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016).

At the local level, the political parties promised to undertake new initiatives during the 2016-2017 elections. For example, Alliance 90/The Greens won the parliamentary elections in Baden-Württemberg with a 30.3% vote in 2016. The AfD ranked third with 15.1% of the vote and entered the Land parliament for the first time. It formed the coalition government with the CDU. The Ministry of Integration was dissolved, and its tasks were given to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration. The coalition agreement also focused on 'effective return management', including removing the difficulties in deportation. The coalition agreed to replace the cash grants given to asylum seekers in the reception centres and replaced them with a "benefits card". In Rhineland-Palatinate, the SPD was the strongest party with 36.2% vote share, and AfD was the third strongest with 12.6% of the vote. SPD formed a coalition with FDP and Alliance 90/Greens. The coalition agreement in the Rhineland-Palatinate tried to facilitate labour market integration with a robust support system. In Saxony-Anhalt, the CDU returned with a 29.8% vote, and AfD got a 24.3% vote. The coalition of CDU/SPD and Alliance 90 was made. The coalition adopted the Integration and Participation Act. It promised to establish a competence centre for the labour market integration of asylum seekers. In Berlin, too, the coalition agreement, led by SPD, Alliance 90 and the Left, agreed on a coalition. Their agreement criticised the 2-year suspension of family reunification for the beneficiaries of subsidiary protection and supported family reunification beyond the core family. Besides, the coalition also supported the "decentralised housing of refugees" (EMN 2017).

There were some weaknesses, too, in the responses at the local level. The asylum welfare is the responsibility of states, and the municipalities implement it. The federal states reimburse the municipalities the amount they have spent on asylum welfare. Every state has its mechanism for reimbursement, and many times federal states could not reimburse them adequately. For example, only 50 million euros were reimbursed by the federal government to Hamburg that spent ten times more than that reimbursement (586.2

million euros) in 2015 (Garrelts et al. 2016). The reimbursement mechanism increases the dependency of municipalities on states. To deal with that, the national government agreed to reimburse the federal states for accommodating refugees, which was earlier the responsibility of states and municipalities. The federal government made the payment of 2 billion per year for the period between 2016 and 2018, 500 million euro/year in 2017 and 2018 specifically for the development of the new facilities for housing refugees and 2.6 billion for the period between 2016 and 2018 to cover up the costs for initial accommodation (Garrelts 2016).

Similarly, rather than promoting integration, the Bavarian integration act focuses on obligations and sanctions for their violations. For example, if someone has not achieved "minimum command of the German language," may be obliged to repay a fair share of support expenses and bear the interpreter costs (EMN 2018). He/she was also obliged to participate in required courses on legal and value order. Violation of constitutional order may attract fines. Associations, trade unions and churches have criticised this approach. The SPD and Alliance 90 criticised it arguing that the act runs counter to federal law and it also lacks clarity and may be tricky for aggrieved parties to understand it (EMN 2018).

Similarly, despite the free language courses for refugees and work permits for a minimum of three months, many refugees were only given subsidiary protection. Therefore, they could not travel to other countries, and family reunification has to go through two years. Refugees are also not allowed to choose where they can live, and the federal government determines their stay for three years. A voucher system was also reintroduced instead of cash transfers and compulsory integration courses and workfare jobs. Some also have to live in camps for an extended period, and language problems also limit jobs opportunities (Koca 2019)

## **Structures and Initiatives**

The entry of refugees in Germany after 2013 forced Germany to take multiple measures to capitalise on the potential of those refugees and asylum seekers. Most of the Syrians, around 87%, were Muslims as per the population surveys in Syria. Most of them (35%) were self-employed as per 2011 statistics. They presented a robust human capital, and it was expected that they might contribute to the German economy. As of 2011, 86.4 per cent of the population was literate (who could read and write). In the early 2000s, around 1 lakh Syrians in Universities make up 6% of the overall population. The Syrians who came were mainly from the upper strata of the Syrian society. They mostly worked in services, trade, health service education etc.

(Smith 2016; Tigau 2019). The overall figures of 2019 refugees, asylum seekers and stateless suggest that most of them (62% were male, and 38% female) were from the working population group (44%)(Oltmer 2017).

To capitalise on these refugees' skill sets, it was necessary to have robust institutions and laws, and this section focuses on those aspects and the challenges the institutions faced.

Before moving into structures, we must look at the laws that empower these institutions. There are various laws in Germany. For example, the German Immigration Act of 2005 contains provisions that regulate entry and residence provision of foreign nationals and asylum procedure. An amendment was made in this act in 2007 to implement eleven EU directives. It was done to combat forced and fake marriages and facilitate the residence of entrepreneurs. In 2015, another act came into being in the form of the Asylum Act. On August 25, 2015, the Chancellor of Germany suspended the EU's Dublin regulations for Syrians. It meant that Syrians coming to Germany would have their asylum supplication processed in Germany itself, even if they have come through another European country. Merkel's decision increased the flow of people. After the appeal in 2015, the asylum recognition got increased(Grote, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016). In 2016, the Integration Act 2016 was implemented at the federal level to facilitate refugee integration. In 2014, an amendment was also made in the Recognition Act. The amendment talks about the fast recognition and assessment of Third-country nationals' qualifications and skills (European Commission 2019).

The government made various legal changes and policy adjustments to accommodate newcomers through asylum packages. These initiatives were received differently by different actors. One of the most crucial steps was the Asylum Package 1 and Asylum Package 2. The Asylum Package 1 or the Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act was brought to speed up the asylum process for some applicants and added more countries to the 'safe countries' list. It also substituted in-kind benefits for cash benefits for those asylum seekers whose application was denied to provide them 'basic subsistence' (Grote, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016; Gesley 2016; Ayoub 2019; DW 2020). In 2017, Asylum Package 2 was introduced which also reduced the time of processing to one week. It also gives one week to appeal in the administrative court. However, there were some issues. Its clause on documentation harmed the refugees from Syria, Iran, or Afghanistan as most have lost their papers during the journey. The act also talks about the suspension of deportation for health and medical grounds and allows for suspension if a person is facing a life-threatening illness(BAMF 2017). In

2016, another act came on Faster Expulsion of Criminal Foreigners. It empowered the authorities to refuse the application if they suspect criminality. Both Dublin regulation and this act received harsh criticism for restricting asylum rights (Grote et al. 2016, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016; Gesley 2016; Ayoub 2019; DW 2020).

In 2016, the government also came with the Integration Act which provided for improvements for asylum seekers having good prospects for remain and whose deportation has been suspended. The Integration act introduced Section 12a of the Residence Act, introduced to promote sustainable integration but also obliges the beneficiary to live in the initial allotted residence for three years. The authorities can also oblige them to take up residence at a specific place. Important associations like the Association of German Districts supported this rule by arguing that this prevents the emergence of deprived areas. In contrast, civil society organisations and welfare associations criticised it for being counterproductive because third-country nationals might be allocated to weak infrastructure areas. The integration act also brought the 3+2 rule. It suspends an asylum seeker's deportation for five years who is granted an apprenticeship in German business. The business association played a crucial role in bringing this rule (EMN 2017).

Further, there are three kinds of protection in Germany: refugee protection, entitlement to asylum and subsidiary protection. Refugee protection is governed by Article 3 of the Asylum Act. It expands the definition of the 1951 convention and includes persecution based on sexual orientation. On the other hand, the entitlement to asylum is less substantive and covers only those persecuted for political reasons and governed by Article 16(a) of the constitution. Under both protection provisions, the recipient gets a 3-year residence permit and later become entitled to permanent settlement. They both allow for family reunification. Subsidiary protection provides residence for only one year but restricts family reunification. The residence act stipulates that even a visa is a kind of residence permit. However, this provision applies only for short stays (Grote, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016; Gesley 2016; Ayoub 2019; DW 2020). The subsidiary protection was backed by a higher court ruling in Schleswig in 2016. The court stated that Syrians should be offered subsidiary protection and allowed to stay for only a year because there was no indication that the "Syrian state put everyone under general suspicion of belonging to the opposition" (as cited in DW 2016). In the initial years, the rate of subsidiary protection was relatively low but has started to rise. In 2015, only 0.6% of Syrians received subsidiary protection, but this number rose to 41 per cent in 2016 and 55 % in 2017.

Due to this status, they cannot bring their relatives to Germany. However, they still get the right to work and benefits as refugees. Those people are living in the instability of annual renewals (Berger 2018).

The family reunification process for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection was suspended in 2016 due to an increase in refugees' number. In 2018, it was restarted, but with few limitations, it was replaced with a new provision that allows visa only for 1000 relatives in a month, subject to the authorities' discretion. The visas are provided only if there is a long separation of family members, separation of families having at least one minor child, severe risks to life, limb and personal freedom of family member living abroad. However, since the introduction of this regulation, the monthly quota was never achieved. Due to the presence of different authorities like embassies, local alien office in Germany and the Federal Administrative Office, it leads to delay in application processing and have problematic effects on unaccompanied minors. The Administrative Court of Berlin has asked authorities to prioritise their applications. With the suspension of family reunification, there was a rise in subsidiary protection rates and thousands of its beneficiaries appealed against the authorities to get refugee status. For Syrian refugees, some regional programmes have been evolved in Berlin (until the end of 2020), Hamburg (until Nov 2020), Thuringia (until the end of December 2020) to counter the problems arising from suspension. They are explicitly reserved for the first and second-degree relatives of the person living in Germany with refuge or other legal residential status. In such cases, they took the responsibility to give the cost of living to their relatives. They can do so by their resources or through external sponsorship. However, there is less information on these regional programmes and their efficiency ((European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) 2020; InfoMigrants 2020).

The German government took various steps to bring refugees through resettlement. For example, the government of Germany introduced the HAP Syria (Humanitarian Admission Programme for Syria. In 2013 and 2014, Germany provided 20,000 resident permits through HAP Syria (Ayoub 2019). It allowed the refugees to enter Germany directly from Syria's neighbouring countries like Egypt or Libya from 2013 to 2015. They were issued two years of residence with an option of renewal (European Resettlement Network 2020). Under HAP Syria, the selection criteria were based on three factors: humanitarian reasons, family ties, and individual ability to contribute to home country development post-conflict. However, their preferences vary in all three stages. Under HAP 1, humanitarian reasons were prioritised before the family ties, and it was followed by individual ability to contribute to reconstructing the home country. In HAP 2 and 3, the

family ties were first, followed by humanitarian criteria and then the ability of refugees to reconstruct the home country. In the integration phase, the new arrivals under HAP and resettlement programme usually came through charter flights. They were accommodated in the reception centres of Bramsche and Friedland. Here the charities offer them counselling. They were also given a five-day course in Germany, covered by the Federal government. Then they were taken to host locations where they were asked to apply for residence titles with local foreign authorities, support measures, health insurance, and bank account. Now here, the resettlement refugees were supported by Counselling Units of Migration Services for Adult Immigrants. Charities primarily run these support centres. Furthermore, through them only, the refugee registers for integration courses (Grote, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016).

Post-2015 onwards, the resettlement policy was expanded. In August 2015, subs. 4 was added to Section 23 of the Residence Act. It gave the legal basis for the admission of resettlement refugees. The resettlement programme was expanded to control irregular migration, offering safe and legal access for protection beneficiaries as well as increasing the burden-sharing among the EU members. Several civil society organisations have worked hard to materialise this programme like the 'Save Me Campaign'. Under the resettlement programme, more than 2000 non-Syrian refugees were admitted from Syria, more than 300 from Turkey, 301 from Egypt, etc. (Grote, Bitterwolf, and Baraulina 2016). There are some limitations too as the resettlement programme was limited to those having family members already in Germany. It has been suggested that those refugees without any prior connection must be admitted as they have less chance of getting admission (Engler 2015). In the resettlement phase, it was argued that refugees need counselling and support during the first year of arrival. Trust building is essential to ensure integration between the counsellors and beneficiaries of protection. However, in rural areas, counselling and integration services are difficult to get. The parallel existence of different programmes and residence titles often creates confusion and insecurity among the refugees as the entitlement and benefits vary in different programmes. The requirement and risk for sponsors are also very high (Engler 2015).

The civil society actors have also come forward to influence policymaking in integration. They have actively participated in the Integration Summit organised by Federal Chancellery. In 2016, 50 migrant organisations participated with some concrete proposals for integration. Various suggestions were given, including the inclusion of Article 20B as a new state objective to ensure diversity and equal opportunities for refugees, expansion of statutory rules against

discrimination rules etc., encouraging participation of migrant organisations(Target 4), equal participation in decision-making functions(Target 3) etc. (BAMF 2016).

For the education of refugees, the state and non-state actors have come forward and collaborated. For example, DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) has assisted the refugees by developing programmes with funding from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) to ensure refugee students' integration. The BMBF allocated a total of 100 million Euros until the year 2019 under the Integra programme. It was to ensure that academically qualified refugees get admission to German universities. It helps by offering language instruction and subject-related preparatory courses (DAAD 2020). Access to higher education is a rigorous task in Germany, and refugee students must meet the German students' minimum requirements. The Syrian refugees are also eligible for monthly allowance through the federal education assistance act to continue their studies. They are calculated as per the personal assets of the student, their earnings and parental income.

Some universities also started initiatives for refugees on their own. For example, at the Free University in Berlin, refugees have been allowed to audit lectures and seminars and get German language training and subject-specific courses. Those refugees who have not enrolled in degree programmes enjoy programs for language instruction, cultural training etc as can be seen in Free University Berlin's(FUB) introductory program for refugees. It offers free academic courses and support services for students and provides general counselling for refugees and Arabic and Farsi counselling. The Berlin School of Economics and Law have also started Join Us and Study (JUST) program. It is created in partnership with Integra support. Another example is the University of Hannover that provides an intoStudy project that offers intensive professional, linguistic and cultural preparation for their studies. It is based on three pillars: language, excursions, events, and English language specialist events. Since its inception, the participation rate is around 40-60 students per year. There are still various limitations in education integration too. Firstly, the language learning courses are often overbooked and are cancelled at a short period of notice. Secondly, there are multiple forms to fill, like one for the BAMF, one for the Federal Labour agency, and another for schooling. The refugees were often assigned with the students for their hearing for asylum, and there is always a trust issue. There is another issue that is linked with the expiration of passports and refugees, mostly the Syrians, have often complained that German authorities were insensitive towards their security concerns and did not help them in renewing their passports that requires going to the

Syrian embassy and preventing the intervention of Syrian secret service. Also, the participation rate in universities' programmes is relatively low (DW 2020; University of Hannover 2020).

In terms of labour market integration initiatives, till October 2018, 35% of refugees that arrived between 2013-16 were employed. Also, market integration has proceeded a little faster than the previous cohorts. The IAP Kurzbercht report argued that their employment rate increases with the duration of their stay. As per the report, 49% of refugees were employed after five years of arrival, 42% after four years of arrival and 37% after three years of arrival. The employment rates seem to be higher than the previous cohorts, and they were primarily employed in skilled activities (52%), followed by semi and unskilled, highly complex and complex specialist activities. The semi and unskilled workers are beneficial for German society as there fewer natives who perform these activities. For better integration, they must remain for longer in the labour market and sustain themselves. Working refugees were also not found to be dependent on social transfer benefits. To improve employability, one of the IAB-BAMF SOEP surveys conducted between 2013 and 2017 found that greater legal certainty about refugees' residence status is required to increase integration chances and give employers confidence(Schludi 2019). The government has taken multiple steps to increase the employability of refugees and asylum seekers. After the integration act came into force in 2016, it was decided that 100000 work opportunities would be given to the asylum seekers each year within and outside the facilities. There is no data on the specifications of the recipients. However, the 100000 work opportunities per year were abandoned with the amendment of the Directive for Labour Market Programme, and the funding was adjusted to 60 million euros per year. It received criticism from opposition political parties for ignoring experts' warnings on creating a parallel structure to existing work opportunities under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act. The Federal Workers' association criticised its compulsive nature. Some states even did not apply for it (Ochsner 2017; Creutzburg and Berlin 2017)

The employment system has some other flaws too. Many of the refugees' qualifications are not accepted in Germany, and they have to wait for an extended period to get a work permit. They also have to do a two-year apprenticeship programme even if they have to start a small work. Even if they are qualified enough to do a job, they need fluent German to prove their interview skills. Also, most refugees end up in the job they are overqualified for and risk getting unemployed in the future. For example, the number of unemployed in Berlin without a German passport has increased by 40% from 2019 due to the COVID-19 pandemic

(Oltermann 2020). Around 42% of the refugees from the top 8 source countries in Germany were employed at the end of 2019. However, they were mostly in low paid jobs and part-time employment with less job security(Elger 2020)

The COVID-19 pandemic has furthered the misery of the migrants. Due to the pandemic, unemployment has increased among the migrants. It has hampered the last push into the labour market of 1.1 million people who arrived in 2015. According to the Federal Labour data, the unemployment from March to June 2020 rose by 27% among the migrants working in the service sector compared to 20% of Germans. They are primarily in sectors where work at home is not feasible, like restaurants, hotels, transport and security. There is less job security in these sectors(Nasr 2020). The reception centres have also faced various difficulties, for example, in the Ellwangen centre, where many Syrian lived faced crowded conditions and lacked protective equipment (Oltermann 2020). The COVID-19 has also impacted the prospect of permanent residency. In 2019, 132,800 Syrians lived under the temporary protection status/subsidiary protection and were waiting for permanent residency. It was expected that the first wave permanent residency would occur in early 2020. However, due to COVID restrictions, that process has delayed. Only 12000 refugees received PR in 2019, but that process slowed down in 2020(al-Jablawi 2019).

Further, the amount of data and information related to the Pandemic is primarily available in the German language. Most Syrians are not well vested in German, and it has often resulted in miscommunication and chaos. For example, in March 2020, the municipality of Suhl put an entire reception centre in lockdown after a refugee was tested positive. However, the reasons for the lockdown were not communicated to refugees. More than 20 refugees tried to flee the centre after a rumour spread regarding their deportation. Some NGOs like ProAsyl have made efforts to translate the refugees' required information (Hesari et al. 2020). With the education system shifting towards e-learning, the migrants have lost social contacts with native speakers(Nasr 2020).

The Syrian refugees have also contributed to the fight against the Pandemic in Germany. Syrian refugees, especially healthcare workers, have played a crucial role during the Pandemic. In Germany, which is short of more than 1.5 lakh health care professionals, the Syrians have helped fill the vacuum(Ahmed 2020). The Syrians also participated in neighbourhood volunteering projects to provide daily needs essential items in the neighbourhood. For example, eAbdulrahiam Al Khattab with his two friends who run such a project in Oberschoeneweide. Similarly, Malakeh Jazmati provided free lunches to supermarket workers in

Schoeneberg(The Local.de 2020)

## Discourse and Relations

To understand discourse and relation, one can begin with Merkel's speech on August 31, 2015, where she reiterated that Germany is a strong country and can accommodate the refugees. It was received differently by different actors in society. Oltermann, in his study, found that deep division was witnessed in civil society and media after the speech of Merkel. Many argued that her phrase, *Wir schaffen das* (We can make it), encouraged millions of migrants to come to Germany through dangerous routes. The Spectator wrote that 'her words cannot be unsaid' and further exacerbate the problem. Similarly, the AfD requoted her words as "You will manage", signifying the imposition of the burden by Merkel on the people. Since then, there have been broader debates on immigration issues and migrant crises seen in varied forms and ways (Oltermann 2020). The AfD, after the Cologne incident, argued that "they do not want to manage it" (Oltermann 2020). At the beginning of 2016, the debate on migration policy was shaped by the Cologne incident. Several other events triggered various legal initiatives like the Act on Faster Expulsion of Criminal Foreigners and Extended Reasons for Refusing Refugee Recognition to Criminal Asylum Seekers, and it was implemented in March 2016. The restriction on family reunification was criticised by the civil society groups and the opposition (EMN 2017).

Many argued that Germany's past drove the liberal stance towards refugees in 2015. It was perceived that it was an effort to correct past wrongdoings (McIntyre, Contreras, and Nguyen 2020). The change in party leadership of AfD also played a crucial role in forming anti-immigrant discourse in various parts of Germany. Bernd Lucke was removed from the leadership of AfD by Frauke Petry. Petry played a crucial role in changing AfD's focus from economic to refugee issues and immigration concerns. Before 2015, there was less debate on the issues of foreigners in Germany. By 2016, there was a rise in anti-immigration sentiment, and people demanded a cap on refugee entry. AfD came into national parliament by obtaining around 12.6% of the vote and 92 seats in Bundestag. Few criticized Petry for stoking anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiment. On the other hand, some saw her as a champion of the rule of law. During this time, slogans like "Der Islam gehoert nicht zu Deutschland" (Islam does not belong to Germany)(Gedmin 2019) came to light. The refugees were targeted for having different attitudes towards women, work and society. The Cologne incident also became an igniting point and was received indifferently even by some people in authority. For example, North-Rhine Westphalia's police tweeted that "what the hell is wrong with the country? Are we trying to appease the Barbaric, Muslims rapist hoarders of men" (as cited in

Gedmin2019). Few anti-immigrant protests were also witnessed. For example, in August 2018, Chemnitz became a centre of protest against immigrants. It also turned violent when some of the demonstrators attacked and harassed, those they perceived as immigrants. This threat perception results from a more considerable discursive change in the society driven by political groups, different ideologies, and increasing anxieties about social changes (Taub and Fisher 2018). They attack others when they feel the loss of belongings control or any threat. The asylum seekers and refugees were also depicted as the state's failure to protect their citizens' interest. The refugees' presence has also brought latent racial overtones about the refugees (as cited in McIntyre, Contreras, and Nguyen 2020). Some scholars have also cited economic reasons for xenophobia. For example, violent crimes in Cottbus have often been associated with the city's sluggish economy. According to the federal employment agency, in Dec 2017, unemployment was 6.9%, and it was 7.9% in 2016 in Cottbus. AfD got 24% of the popular vote of Cottbus during the elections (Brady 2018). Another event that fueled the debate was the extension of the suspension of family reunification for subsidiary migrants. When it was restarted in 2018, the coalition government at the centre was deeply divided. The Greens argued that the quota of 1000 trampled the fundamental rights and hinders integration. On the other hand, the ruling coalition defended the limits by arguing that it would consider exceptional cases (DW 2018).

The deportation of Syrian refugees is another issue that has ignited debate in Germany. In 2012 Germany banned the deportation of Syrians that allowed every asylum seekers, even the rejected ones, to stay in Germany. After the stabbing incident in Dresden, where a Syrian man was arrested for allegedly carrying a knife, the call for deportation was on the rise. In December 2020, the Interior minister decided to lift the ban and declared that deportation would be decided on a case-by-case basis. In a virtual meeting, he said that "Those who commit crimes or pursue terrorist aims to do serious harm to our state and our population should and will have to leave our country" (Hans-Georg Engelkeas cited in Arab News 2020). It drew vehement criticism from various human rights group. Boris Pistorius from SPD argued that it is an impractical decision as there are no stable institutions in Syrian to deal with (Arab News 2020; DW 2020).

The anti-immigrant agenda, although very low, has impacted public perception. It was noted in one of the surveys - TNS Emnid Surveys - that demonstrations against Muslim immigration by thousands in Dresden and elsewhere under the banner of Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des

Abendlandes (PEGIDA, Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) seem to indicate a renewed anti-immigrant and racist sentiment in large sections of the German public. In a TNS Emnid survey commissioned by the liberal weekly Die Zeit after the Paris attack a week earlier, many people (35%) voted to reduce refugees from Islamic countries. In a poll by the Institute Forsa, 52% disagreed with the statement "Islam belongs to Germany," while 44% agreed. This endorsement of Islam was most potent (61%) among the 14- to 29-year-old. East Germans, respondents without higher education and older residents dominated among those who disagree (as cited in Adam 2015, Dearden 2016).

The anti-immigrant sentiment was also witnessed in the rise of local grouping. For example, the Homeland Defense initiative drew a large number of supporters in protest in 2015. In 2014 and 2015, aggression by such groupings/individuals against refugees was 198 in 2014 and more than 200 in 2015 (Faiola 2015). There were also incidents of looting, arson and attacks. In various places, violence was also witnessed against refugee shelters. According to BKA (Federal Criminal Offence), there were 925 such offences in 2015 compared to 199 in 2014 (Engler 2016). As per Germany's Federal Office of Criminal Investigations, there has been a record rise in criminal offences linked to migrants between 2014 and 2016. The percentage of asylum seekers involved in them have also doubled (Oltermann 2020). The groups like PEGIDA and parties like AfD are most active in Eastern parts of Germany like Chemnitz and Wismar because it has less experience dealing with refugees in the past and had remained anti-immigrant before the reunification (Reuters 2018, BBC News 2017).

Media reporting also played a crucial role in the debate on immigration and integration. The reporting patterns also have changed after 2015. There were some crucial junctures that many researchers found to be critical in determining refugee discourse in Germany. According to Hartweg, after Merkel's call for supporting refugees in 2015, many media outlets, including Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Bild etc., supported her move. Hatweg pointed out some crucial initiatives like Bild ran a campaign called "Helping Out" to increase awareness about refugees. However, the Paris attack started changing the narrative. According to Brenner and Ohlendorf, and Hartweg, after the terror attacks in Paris, the reporting started changing and started highlighting the threats terrorism and refugees could pose to Germans. Finally, the Cologne incident changed the discourse in media reporting. In many cases, like in Munich's mass shooting, the media tried to link the origin of non-Germans and the threat to domestic security. It was alleged that many of the perpetrators were from the Middle East or North Africa (Brenner and Ohlendorf

2016, Ruth S. Hartweg 2019). In one of his work, Ayoub found that most of the articles published in one of the leading news sites called Die Welt framed the refugee issue as a "problem". Also, most articles talk about the economic costs of hosting refugees rather than their contribution economically. They were found to be negatively constructing the image of refugees (Ayoub 2019). The extent of misinformation could be exemplified by a Syrian refugee man who clicked a selfie with Merkel. It was widely circulated on social media in 2015. However, numerous false stories got linked to him, and he was posed as a perpetrator of a truck attack at the Berlin Christmas market in December 2016 (Eddy 2017; Ruth S. Hartweg 2019). There has been less reporting on how refugees fared economically and contributed to German society (Maria Müller 2017).

The government have also tried to counter such sentiments. For example, in Aug 2015, Germany's interior minister criticised the right-wing militants and racists after a scuffle near Dresden. It was reported that some people were shouting "Heil Hitler". Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said, "At the same time as we see a wave of people wanting to help, we have a rise in hate, insults and violence against asylum seekers. That is obscene and unworthy of our country" (as cited in BBC News 2017). Apart from the German government, there are responses from the German society to encourage refugees' integration. This started with the thousands of people welcoming refugees at the railway stations in 2016, making an in-kind donation, giving meals and other emergency services (Engler 2016). The mainstream media have also condemned the violent attacks against the refugees and their housings. Some programmes like "Tagesthemen" also called for action against hateful posts in social media against the refugees. To counter fake information, "Spiegel Online" ran an explainer series called "Facts about the refugee crisis- finally clear" (DW 2015).

## Conclusions

Refugee integration is a complex task and involves a multitude of international and local actors. Any theorisation and explanation of integration must keep in mind its complexities, and Phillimore's model tries to address those complexities. In this paper, an attempt has been made to understand the refugee integration in Germany for the post-2013 cohort of refugee and asylum seekers by using Phillimore's model. Although this model has helped identify the specificities of integration by looking into objective analysis as well as subjective and discursive implications that impact societal relations, few limitations exist. Firstly, the amount of data required to execute such a project is limited, and it requires in-depth investigations through

primary data collection and field studies. This problem is further magnified as the limited data on a particular cohort group, such as Syrian refugees, and most of the secondary data available lacks the required depth, at least in the English language. Further, there is also significantly less data on refugee employability and their education. Secondly, the opportunity structure model needs more clarity. For example, the discourse level analysis is challenging to execute because multiple actors, ranging from state to non-state actors, are involved in discourse formation, and it poses a great challenge to analyse all of them. Although the data available on structures and initiatives is in abundance, significantly less data is available on the initiatives' impacts.

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## Acronyms

AfD: Alternative für Deutschland

BAMF: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

CDU: Christian Democratic Union of Germany

CSOs: Civil Society Organisations

DAAD German Academic Exchange Service

HAP: Humanitarian Assistance Programme

SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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**About Author:** Pulkit Buttan is an M.Phil. student/researcher in the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, Gujarat. His M.Phil dissertation is related to the refugee crisis and integration initiatives. His major areas of interest are international relations, refugee and migration studies.

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